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With the 2011 enactment of major pension reform legislation in New Jersey, legal 
questions regarding the rights of public employees to their benefits have been brought to the 
forefront of public debate. A state-by-state analysis shows that there is a wide variety of 
approaches to the central legal question raised by all pension reform efforts: when and how can a 
state make changes to its public employee pension programs? The answers can be found in the 
common law, state and federal constitutions, as well as questions of statutory construction, and 
legislative intent. Since 2009, New Jersey legislators have taken steps to implement a new 
scheme for pension plans, retirement plans, and collective bargaining rights for public 
employees. Their efforts culminated on June 28, 2011, when Governor Chris Christie signed 
Senate Bill 2937 into law.1 Due to some of the changes imposed by 2011 P.L. Ch. 782 (“2011 
Pension Reform Legislation"), public employee unions have initiated litigation against the state.3 
 New Jersey Senate President Stephen Sweeney (D. Gloucester) helped lead in the 
passage of the legislation after building bipartisan support for the sweeping changes set forth in 
the bill. The Act repeals or amends over eighty laws and significantly alters public employee 
pension, retirement, and healthcare plans.4 Notably, the law raises the age of retirement for some 
individuals, alters the amount of employee contributions, and eliminates the cost-of-living 
adjustment.5 While the purpose and effect of the law are in dispute, the Legislature holds that it 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. in Art and Art History, Colgate University, cum 
laude, 2010. I would like to thank Professor Rosenkrans for his dedication, guidance, and advice during this process. 
1 Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee Statement to Senate, No. 2937, 2011 Leg., 214th Sess. 2 (N.J. 2011) 
[hereinafter Committee Statement]. 
2 2011 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 78 (West). 
3 See Bill Wichert, Dems Attacking Christie Allies Over State Union Setbacks, STAR-LEDGER, Aug. 15, 2011, at 003, 
available at 2011 WLNR 16153221; see also Complaint, N.J. Educ. Assoc. v. State, No. 3:11-CV-0502 (D.N.J. 
filed Aug. 31, 2011), 2011 WL 3850262 [hereinafter Complaint]. 
4 See 2011 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 78 (West). 
5 Committee Hearings, supra note 1. 
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amended the law to comply with federal and state tax regimes and treasury regulations.6 The law 
is meant to cut costs, although public employees allege that the new law continues the State’s 
practice of underfunding the pension system.7 The New Jersey Education Association, along 
with other interested parties, filed a complaint in federal court on August 31, 2011.8 This Note 
will analyze the possibility of success in this litigation and propose an alternative approach to 
pension reform enactment that is more consistent with New Jersey law.9 
 This Note analyzes the recent reform in New Jersey and subsequent litigation to propose 
that the state adopt a concrete, contractual approach to reform, where legislators can 
prospectively alter pension law, but will be estopped from making retroactive changes. Part I of 
this Note will provide background information on federal and state regulation of pension 
benefits, and discuss case law analyzing prior pension reform efforts in New Jersey and in other 
states. Part II will provide general background information on pension reform and analyze 
specific details of New Jersey’s 2011 Pension Reform Legislation. Finally, Part III will analyze 
the New Jersey litigation by looking at the policy considerations likely to guide the court, the 
legal merits of the claims asserted, and the likelihood of success. Additionally, Part III will 
suggest that New Jersey adopt a bright-line contract theory-based approach to pension reform 
that sets out to only make prospective changes to the law, to avoid future contract-based 
challenges from employees. 
 
 
                                                          
6 Id. 
7 Complaint, supra note 3. 
8 Id. 
9 See N.J. Educ. Assoc. v. State, 989 A.2d 282 (N.J. Super. 2010); see also Prof’l Firefighters’ Assoc. of N.J. v. 
State, No. A-3681-08T3 (N.J. Super. Aug. 23, 2011). 
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I. Background on Regulation of Pension Benefits in the United States and New Jersey and 
Application in Case Law 
 Pension plans for private and public employees are regulated differently.10 Federal laws, 
including the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Internal Revenue 
Code generally govern private employee pensions and benefits, and state laws generally govern 
plans for state and local government employees.11 While regulation varies among states, in some 
cases drastically, federal law does sometimes also provide for the protection of public employee 
benefits.12 Additionally, both public and private pensions are subject to federal constitutional 
constraints.  
 Before discussing the specifics of federal and state regulation of employee benefits, it is 
necessary to provide background on the most common types of pension plans. Defined benefit 
plans allow for employees to receive a monthly payment for life once they retire, as provided by 
in a defined formula.13 Funding for these types of plans may come from employee and/or 
employer contributions, stock, or other investment returns.14 Actuaries are typically responsible 
for setting the contribution rates for these plans and making sure that the financial risk of such a 
plan is properly calculated.15 
 In contrast to the defined benefit plan, the defined contribution plan does not ensure 
regular monthly payments for the employee, but instead accrues contributions that are stored in 
an account from which the employee may withdraw, in full if he desires, upon retirement.16 
                                                          
10 Anna K. Selby, Pensions in a Pinch: Why Texas Should Reconsider its Policies on Public Retirement Benefit 
Protection, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1211, 1214 (2011).  
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 1215. 
14 Id. 
15 Selby, supra note 10 at 1215-16. 
16 Id. at 1217. 
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Recently, some states have stopped offering definite benefit plans, and instead offered alternative 
defined contribution plans, or combination plans.17  
 To receive benefits from either type of plan, an employee must obtain legal rights to the 
payments.18 This process is known as “vesting,” which “confers upon an employee a ‘complete 
and consummated right not contingent upon any future event.’”19 Depending on the plan, an 
employee may vest his rights to benefits after a particular period during his employment.20 
Whether an employee has vested his rights to benefits may impact the amount and nature of the 
contributions he can receive.21 The type of plan and whether or not it creates a vested right to 
benefits are extremely important factors when examining the legal issues raised by state pension 
reform efforts. 
a. New Jersey 
 Pension plans and retirement benefits are regulated by New Jersey’s state constitution 
and in Titles 18 and 43 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated. Additionally, pensions for public 
employees are subject to New Jersey’s Contract Clause.22 Title 18 of New Jersey Statute governs 
Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund Law (TPAF)23 and Title 43, Chapter 15A governs the 
Public Employees Retirement System (PERS).24  
                                                          
17 Robert L. Clark, State and Local Pensions in the United States, Prepared for Workshop on Civil Service and 
Military Pension Arrangements, 11, January 20-21, 2011, available at http://cis.ier.hit-
u.ac.jp/Japanese/society/conference1101/clark-paper.pdf. 
18 Selby, supra note 10 at 1217. 
19 Id. at 1218 (citing Dan M. McGill, Preservation of Pension Benefit Rights 7, 5 (1972)). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 3 states: “The Legislature shall not pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law 
impairing the obligation of contracts, or depriving a party of any remedy for enforcing a contract which existed 
when the contract was made.” 
23 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:66-1 (West 2011). 
24 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:15A (West 2011). 
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 Additionally, the New Jersey Legislature has amended pension statutes through yearly 
public laws.25 For instance, New Jersey P.L, 1997, ch. 113 adopts a contract theory-based 
approach to pension reform, but only guarantees “non-forfeitable right[s]” to “vested” retirees 
and sets out the state’s responsibility to contribute “annual normal contribution[s.]”26 However, 
Chapter 113 also reserved control for the Legislature by stating that it would “not preclude the 
forfeiture, suspension or reduction of benefits for dishonorable service[.]”27 Over the past ten 
years, the Legislature has altered eligibility requirements, actuarial formulas, and employer 
contributions to the public pension system.28  
i. Case Law in New Jersey under a Contract Clause Analysis 
New Jersey courts have historically been reluctant to overturn pension reform legislation. 
In Spina v. Consolidated Police and Firemen’s Pension Fund Commission,29 the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey held that pension reform which resulted in minor alterations to retirement 
eligibility requirements did not constitute a contractual impairment or taking.30 The court 
reasoned that there was no explicit indication that the legislation would create a contractual 
obligation with the members of the fund.31 Instead the court held, “the terms and conditions of 
public service in office or employment rest in legislative policy rather than contractual 
obligation, and hence may be changed except of course insofar as the State Constitution 
                                                          
25 Recent Legislation, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, DIVISION OF PENSION AND BENEFITS 
(Sept. 29, 2011, 4:03 PM), http://www.nj.gov/treasury/pensions/newlaw11.shtml. 
26 N.J.P.L. 1997, ch. 113. 
27 The law states that employees’ rights to their pension will not restrict the State from amending the retirement 
system with future legislation. Recent Legislation: Chapter 113, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF THE 
TREASURY, DIVISION OF PENSION AND BENEFITS (Sept. 29, 2011, 4:03 PM),  
http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/pensions/lawsfy97.shtml#ch113. 
28 N.J.P.L 2003, ch. 108. 
29 Spina v. Consol. Police and Firemen’s Pension Fund Comm’n, 197 A.2d 169 (S. Ct. NJ 1964). 





specifically provides otherwise.”32 However, the court refused to adopt a defined approach to 
pension benefits, referring to contributions as “compensation,” “reward[,]” and 
“noncompensatory payment to further the public employer's own interests[.]”33 Ultimately, Spina 
declares that the legal question of pensions as a contractual obligation, property interest, or 
perhaps some form of gratuity does not require detailed analysis, as the issue is “too academic to 
be pursued, for our Legislature would not think of making off with a fund.”34 Expanding on the 
nature of pensions described in Spina, the court in Uricoli v. Board of Trustees, acknowledged 
pension plans as a kind of deferred compensation meant to provide necessary security for 
employees.35 The Court noted the particular importance of protecting pension for public 
employees to protect “employment stability and financial security.”36  
Forty years after Spina, in New Jersey Education Association v. State,37 members of the 
state’s teachers union and pension fund unsuccessfully pushed for constitutional protection for a 
contract right to their pensions under TPAF.38 While the lower court found that the State was 
contractually obligated to provide funding for the pension system as a matter of law, plaintiffs 
did not bear their burden to show a substantial impairment that would violate the State and 
Federal Contract Clauses.39 Plaintiffs alleged that from 2004-2007, the Legislature underfunded 
the fund by $2.6 billion, but the court found that evidence of such underfunding was 
unsubstantiated.40 The court also found that TPAF members did not have a contractual right to 
the “manner or method” of funding in the system, and thus did not satisfy the second prong of 
                                                          
32 Id. at 173. 
33 Id. at 174. 
34 Spina, 197 A.2d at 175. 
35 Uricoli v. Bd. of Tr., 449 A.2d 1267, 1273 (N.J. 1982). 
36 Id. 
37 N.J. Educ. Ass’n v. State, 989 A.2d 282 (N.J. Super. 2010). 
38 Id. at 283.  
39 Id. at 284. 
40 Id. at 287. 
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the analysis.41 In articulating this holding, the court cited the established rule, “a statute will not 
be presumed to create private, vested contractual rights, unless the intent to do so is clearly 
stated.”42 Citing Spina, the court affirmed that New Jersey defers to legislative intent, and though 
the state recognizes employees’ property interest in earned benefits, it does not recognize a 
contractual obligation to ensure that pensions are paid in a certain way unless legislation clearly 
explicates such intent.43 While “non-forfeitable right to receive benefits,” as stated in the statute, 
does create a contractual obligation for the state to provide those benefits to public employees, an 
employee’s right does not extend to the management of those funds.44 
Finally, in the most recent ruling concerning this matter, Professional Firefighters 
Association of New Jersey v. State,45 several unions brought suit against the state in response to 
2003 legislation altering the pension scheme under PFRS by decreasing employer contribution 
rates.46 While plaintiffs argued that the state should treat employees’ rights to pensions as a 
contract, the court ultimately followed New Jersey Education Association by rejecting the 
theory.47 This court clarified, “[u]nlike many other states, our constitution does not expressly 
create a contractual right to retirement benefits . . . We will not recognize such a right unless it is 
‘so plainly expressed that one cannot doubt the individual legislator understood and intended 
it.’”48  
New Jersey courts are resistant to acknowledge a public employee’s interest in his 
pension as a contractual right, despite examining challenges to pension reform under the 
                                                          
41 Id. at 284. 
42 Id. at 292 citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santé Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 465-466 
(1985).   
43 N.J. Educ. Ass’n, 989 A.2d  at 296-297. 
44 Id. at 297. 
45 Prof’l Firefighters Ass’n of N.J. v. State, No. A-3681-08T3 (N.J. Super. Aug. 23, 2011). 
46 Id. at 1. 
47 Id. at 3. 
48 Id. at 4 quoting Spina v. Consol. Police and Firemen’s Pension Fund Comm’n, 197 A.2d 169 (S. Ct. NJ 1964).  
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established Contract Clause analysis. As such, New Jersey seems to adopt a hybrid-approach to 
pension benefits, which combines gratuity, property right, and contract theories of pension law. 
Consequently, public employees and employers subject to pension reform in New Jersey suffer 
from a lack of consistently interpreted and uniform law.  
b. State Approaches 
 While ERISA, the Tax Code, and § 302 of the NLRA broadly protect some aspects of 
employees’ rights to benefits, some states have gone far to create regional regulation for public 
employees. There is a great deal of variation among states’ regulation of pensions and benefits. 
To understand the nature and scope of various states legislation of pension benefits, it is 
necessary to provide a background on the theoretical approaches to pensions in a legal 
framework. There are at least four theories defining the nature of an employee’s right to pension 
benefits, including pension as gratuity, as contract, as property right, and under promissory 
estoppel.49  
i. Pension as Gratuity 
The theory of pension as gratuity treats public pension plans as gifts, rather than as 
contracted terms or compensation.50 Therefore, under this theory, pension plans could be altered 
or eliminated at any time without redress by the employee.51 In a gratuity jurisdiction, an 
employee does not have vested rights in his pension plan, so the Government may amend the 
plan freely.52 Additionally, an employer may expressly state in its contract with the employee 
that the benefits are treated as gratuities and as such, the employer may dismiss the employee at 
                                                          
49 Amy B. Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal Framework, LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER 
SERIES, No. 10-13. 2010. 
50 Id. at 3. 
51 Id. 
52 John Martinez, 2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 10:39 (Sept. 2011). 
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any time without having to confer the benefits through the plan.53 For corporate entities in New 
Jersey, voluntary pension plans that the employee does not contribute to do not create contractual 
obligations, but are treated as gratuities, and the employee does not hold vested rights until he 
has actually received benefits.54 The gratuity approach has been rejected by most states based on 
constitutional conflicts or policy changes; however Indiana, Texas, and Arkansas still adhere to 
this approach to some extent.55  
 ii. Pension as Contract 
 Contractual jurisdictions suggest that a pension plan creates a contract between the entity 
and the employee.56 The contract may be implied by the circumstances of employment or 
explicitly declared by state constitution.57 Modifications to a pension plan are applied in a 
contract law context.58 When the contract is implied, the court must look to the United States 
Constitution’s Contract Clause, or the state constitution’s version.59  
 The Contract Clause prohibits states from passing legislation that impairs existing 
contracts, whether they are public or private.60 Determining whether amending employee 
pension plans or benefits violates the Contract Clause requires a three-step analysis. First, the 
court must examine whether a contractual relationship exists.61 It must then determine whether 
the change in law constitutes a substantial impairment to the employee’s rights.62 Finally, it must 
                                                          
53 W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Rights and Liabilities as between Employer and Employee with Respect to General 
Pension or Retirement Plan, 42 A.L.R. 2d 461 (1955). 
54 William Meade Fletcher, Employee Benefit Plans, in 6 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS, 
ch. 24, § 2522.10; see also Dolan v. Heller Bros. Co., 104 A.2d 860 (N.J. Super. 1954). 
55 Monahan, supra note 49 at 3. 
56 Shipley, supra note 53 at ch. II, § 4. 
57 Monahan, supra note 49 at 3. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
61 Terry A.M. Mumford, Mary Leto Pareka, Ice Miller Donado & Ryan. The Employer’s (In) Ability to Reduce 




determine if the impairment is reasonable and necessary to achieve the Government’s goals.63 
Effectively, states adhering to the contract theory are limited in their reform options because of 
the stricter constitutional analysis. 
 Within the contract theory approach, there are three general directions a state may take 
when offering protection. First, a state may provide constitutional protection of past and future 
benefit accruals.64 Under this approach, adopted in New York, Alabama, Illinois, and Arizona, 
states have the greatest challenge in successfully reforming pension rights.65 In these states, 
changes to pension plans cannot result in less desirable benefits for the employee, because such a 
modification would violate the contractual obligation created by the plan.66 In New York, this 
protection is codified in the state constitution, which explicitly provides, “membership in any 
pension or retirement system of the state or of a civil division thereof shall be a contractual 
relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.”67 While New York’s 
broad protection provides that pension plans cannot be changed if they lessen the employee’s 
benefits in some way, it does not limit employers from changing other conditions that may 
adversely affect pension benefits.68  
 Second, a state may provide constitutional protection of only past benefit accruals.69 
Under this approach, followed by Michigan, Hawaii, and Louisiana, earned benefits are 
protected, but future benefits are not.70 The interpretation of this protection may mean that an 
employee does not have the right to benefits he would acquire through continued work (and thus, 
                                                          
63 Id. at 36.  
64 Monahan, supra note 49, at 7. 
65 Id. at 28-30. 
66 Id. at 7. 
67 N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 7. 
68 For example, an employer may reduce an employee’s salary. Lippman v. Bd. of Educ. of the Sewanhaka Cent. 
High Sch. Dist., 487 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1985). 
69 Monahan, supra note 49, at 10. 
70 Id. at 10-11. 
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conditions of a pension plan may be altered freely so long as the changes take place in the 
future), or that an employee only has rights to past benefits that were earned while vested in the 
plan.71 
 Finally, a state may not rely on its state constitution as a source of protection, and instead 
treat pensions as deferred compensation as a term of the employment contract.72 The majority of 
jurisdictions treat pension benefits as a contractual obligation and adhere to an analysis based in 
contract theory, though it is similar to the Constitutional analysis.73 The balancing test has three 
elements, and proposes to weigh the state’s police power with the interests of the employee to 
get the benefit of their bargain.74 The analysis considers 1) the existence and scope of the 
contract; 2) whether the contract has been substantially impaired; and 3) whether the impairment 
is reasonable and necessary to satisfy an important public purpose.75 The first element examines 
whether there is a binding agreement and to what extent the parties are bound.76 For the second 
element, different jurisdictions have found that formula changes, changes to funding 
methodology, and elimination of cost-of-living adjustments constitute substantial impairments.77 
For the third element, a court may determine the reasonableness of the impairment based on 
intent, foreseeability, and the extent of the resulting change.78 To determine necessity, “a [s]tate 
is not completely free to consider impairing the obligations of its own contracts on a par with 
other policy alternatives . . . a [s]tate is not free to impose a drastic impairment when an evident 
                                                          
71 Id. at 11. 
72 Id. 
73 Martinez, supra note 52. 
74 Id. 
75 Energy Reserves Grp. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 (1983). 
76 Id. 
77 See Betts v. Bd. of Admin., 582 P.2d 614 (1978); Valdes v. Cory, 139 Cal. App. 3d 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Bd. 
of Admin. v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Calabro v. City of Omaha, 531 N.W.2d 541 (Neb. 
1995). 
78 U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 2, 27, 35 (1977). 
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and more moderate course would serve its purposes equally well.”79 Additionally, the state must 
show that it could not have achieved its purpose without the change to the contract.80  
Some courts have held that, notwithstanding the three-part test, an impairment may still 
be constitutional if it is accompanied by some kind of new advantage.81 Indeed, Colorado calls 
this theory the “partial vesting” approach, and maintains that the accompanying advantage must 
be: (1) of a beneficial nature; (2) actuarially necessary; or (3) strengthens and improves the 
pension plan.82 Additionally, while some jurisdictions allow unilateral modifications of pension 
plans, this rule conflicts with most contract law.83 Moreover, some jurisdictions hold that there is 
no contractual right to a particular amount of funding, so any diminution or impairment by 
pension law will not constitute breach.84 
1. Case Law Under Contract Clause Analysis 
In the seminal case, Dodge v. Board of Education of Chicago,85 the Supreme Court 
dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint that the Miller Law, which decreased pension payments to 
retired public school teachers in Chicago and applied retroactively and prospectively, was 
unconstitutional, pursuant to the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution.86 The Court declared 
that “[t]he presumption is that such a law is not intended to create private contractual or vested 
rights, but merely declares a policy to be pursued until the Legislature shall ordain otherwise.”87 
The Court further implied that the presumption will only be rebutted if there is some explicit 
                                                          
79 Id. at 30-31. 
80 Id. at 29-30. 
81 Monahan, supra note 49 at 18. 
82 Martinez, supra note 52, citing Peterson v. Fire and Police Pension Ass'n, 759 P.2d 720 (Colo. 1988). 
83 In Alaska, Delaware, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and West Virginia, courts permitted unilateral modification “(1) in 
order to enhance actuarial soundness; or (2) if the change bears a material relation to the purpose of the system and 
if the resultant disadvantage to the employee is accompanied by an offsetting advantage.” However, Martinez 
acknowledges that this analysis may contradict U.S. Trust Co. Id. 
84 Fletcher, supra note 54. 
85 Dodge v. Bd. of Educ.of Chi., 302 U.S. 72 (1937). 
86 Id. at 75. 
87 Id. at 72. 
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language in the text of the legislation that indicates existence of a contract, or if circumstances 
illustrate a clear legislative intent to create a contractual obligation.88  
 While Dodge lays the foundation for analysis, courts that adopt the contract approach are 
loosening the reins. Many jurisdictions will declare legislation unconstitutional if it applies 
retroactively. In Andrews v. Anne Arundel County,89 former county officials sought recovery and 
injunctive relief, pursuant to the Contract Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against legislation, 
which retroactively reduced pension benefits, the purpose of which was to cut costs.90 The court 
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on both counts.91 They found that case law supported contractual 
rights in pension plans for vested participants and that the legislation created a substantial 
impairment because the elected and appointed officials relied on the terms of the contract.92 
Additionally, the court held that although the purpose of saving costs was important, the County 
did not show that the means taken were the least drastic available.93  
 In Mascio v. Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio,94 plaintiff, Judge John 
Mascio, who was collecting retirement benefits while simultaneously earning a full salary as an 
elected official, brought a claim against Ohio’s public retirement system after it enacted an 
amendment to prevent “double-dipping.”95 The amendment would force a retiree in plaintiff’s 
position to receive his salary and postpone receiving his pension benefits.96 The Sixth Circuit 
held that Mascio was entitled to a preliminary injunction against the State, because under Ohio 
law, once an individual’s rights have vested in his pension, the benefits cannot retroactively be 
                                                          
88 Id. at 79. 
89 Andrews v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 931 F. Supp. 1255 (D.Md. 1996). 
90 Id. at 1257. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 1265. 
93 Id. at 1266. 
94 Mascio v. Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. of Ohio, 160 F.3d 310 (6th Cir. 1998). 
95 Id. at 311-12. 
96 Id. at 312. 
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withheld.97 Because Mascio’s pension was vested and he had begun receiving benefits before the 
amendment was enacted, the State’s forfeiture of his benefits constituted a Contract Clause 
violation.98 
 Some jurisdictions, however, still adhere to the Dodge analysis, and are hesitant to find a 
contractual obligation. In Parker v. Wakelin, the First Circuit reversed the district court’s holding 
that amendments to the Maine State Retirement System violated the Contract Clause with regard 
to vested members of the system.99 The Maine Education Association challenged the legislation, 
which did not affect those individuals already receiving benefits under the system, under the 
Contract Clause, Due Process Clause, and Takings Clause.100 The First Circuit could not engage 
in the full analysis under the Contract Clause because they could not establish the existence of a 
contract from the legislation under the “unmistakability doctrine.”101 Similar to the standard 
expressed in Dodge, the unmistakability doctrine presumes that legislation does not create a 
contractual obligation.102  
Parker is careful to point out that although many jurisdictions have drifted from the 
gratuity approach and adopted some version of the contract approach, a qualified approach is 
most appropriate. The Ninth Circuit adopted such an approach: “[t]he ‘better reasoned view’ 
recognizes that non-vested employees have contractual rights in pension plans ‘subject to 
reasonable modification in order to keep the system flexible to meet changing conditions, and to 
maintain the actuarial soundness of the system.’”103  
                                                          
97 Id. at 313. 
98 Id. at 314. 
99 Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1997). 
100 Id. at 3. 
101 Id. at 5. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 6 (quoting Nev. Emp. Ass’n v. Keating, 903 F.2d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
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 In Koster v. City of Davenport, the Court strongly implied that a contract was not created 
by pension reform legislation in Iowa, but held that even if employees had a contract right in 
their benefits, the legislation (which allowed municipalities discretion to use excess funds for 
either employees’ or the city’s future contributions) did not substantially impair their rights.104 
 In Robertson v. Kulongoski,105 current and former public employees argued that recent 
amendments to the Oregon Public Employees Retirement System violated the Contract 
Clause.106 Under the challenged 2003 legislation, employees would lose a variety of previous 
benefits under the system, and lose annual cost-of-living adjustments.107 While the Ninth Circuit 
follows, for the most part, the traditional analysis under the Contract Clause, they make a 
departure when qualifying that the relevant question under the first prong is not the existence of 
the contract in general, but whether there was an agreement regarding specific terms.108 
Applying this standard, the Court found that the legislation did not create a contract in the 
specific terms at issue, and thus, there was no violation.109 
 iii. Promissory Estoppel 
 Under the theory of promissory estoppel, a promise that is otherwise not legally binding 
will be enforced to prevent injustice if the promisor should reasonably expect the promisee to 
rely on the promise and if the promisee did rely on the promise to his detriment.110 Some states 
reject the contract or gratuity approach and instead adopt some version of a promissory estoppel 
theory. Minnesota, for example, has developed a test that determines that if there is 1) existence 
of a clear and definite promise, 2) the promisor intended to induce reliance, and such reliance 
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occurred, and 3) the promise must be enforced to prevent injustice, then the employee has the 
right to enforce his promise.111 Still, this theory is limited; as several federal cases have held, the 
doctrine “conflicts with the rule that a surrender of reserved legislative powers is not to be 
inferred but, rather, can only be effectuated by a clear and unambiguous expression of legislative 
intent.”112 Due to the nature of the analysis, litigation using a promissory estoppel approach will 
have to go through a fact specific analysis for any case. 
 iv. Property Right 
 The rights in a public pension plan can be treated as property, and are protected under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (or state equivalents for due process).113 Thus, under this 
theory, when pension plans are reformed the legislation may qualify as unconstitutional if it is 
viewed as a taking without just compensation.114 Several states, including Connecticut, 
Wisconsin, Maine, New Mexico, and Ohio follow this approach.115  
 1. Case Law Under Property Right Analysis 
 Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York defined a factor-balancing test that 
weighs government interests with the employee’s right to property.116 The factors include: “[t]he 
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant[,] ‘the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations[,]’ and ‘the character of the 
governmental action.’”117 The analysis from this seminal case informs other courts dealing with 
Takings issues with pension reform challenges. 
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Connecticut adopted the property right approach in Pineman v. Oechslin,118 which 
granted employees’ rights to retirement benefits after vesting.119 The court explicitly held that a 
state pension plan creates a property interest for all public employees, and employees’ interests 
are protected from “arbitrary legislative action under the due process provisions of our state and 
federal constitutions.”120  
 In Parella v. Retirement Bd. of Rhode Island Employees’ Retirement System,121 retired 
legislators claimed that capping benefits to comply with tax laws violated Takings, Contract, and 
Due Process clauses.122 Following their initial suit, Congress repealed the tax provision preceded 
the pension reform law, and the State duly refunded the lost benefits.123 Ultimately, the First 
Circuit determined that because the retirees had no contractual right to the benefits, the claim for 
a violation of the Takings Clause also failed, because the benefits could not be considered 
property.124 
c. Federal Regulation 
Generally, federal regulation does not control public employee benefits.125 ERISA and 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 govern private pension plans and benefits.126 ERISA was 
enacted in 1974, and broadly regulates pension plans and other benefits in the private sphere.127 
Specifically, ERISA controls the extent that information is accessible, fiduciary obligations are 
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imposed upon those responsible for plans, and individuals are able to state grievances through 
established processes.128  
While ERISA confers a defined scheme of protection for private employees, the Tax 
Code provides certain incentives for various plans, particularly retirement plans.129 To receive 
the incentivized tax treatment, employers and employees must engage in a “qualified plan,” 
which meets the specific requirements of the Code.130 Such a plan must originate in the United 
States,  form a plan to exclusively benefit the employee, and satisfy the listed requirements under 
I.R.C. § 401.131 Should the plan fulfill these requirements, the Government will only tax the 
employee when money is received from the plan,132 the Government will not tax the employer’s 
contribution,133 the employer can immediately deduct his contributions for the taxable year,134 
and the Government will not tax the trust’s investment income.135 For a tax benefit to apply, 
however, the plan cannot be amended to decrease accrued benefits of any participant, under the 
anti-cutback rule codified in I.R.C. § 411(d)(6).136 The anti-cutback rule does not prevent 
amendments that decrease accrued future benefits, and state plans are exempted from the rule.137 
Although ERISA and the Tax Code are the major elements of federal regulation of 
pension benefits, § 302 of the National Labor Relations Act is also an important aspect of federal 
protection, exclusively concerning collective bargaining agreements.138 Although § 302 is less 
expansive than other federal regulation, as a criminal statute it is strict in its enforcement of 
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preventing employers from deceptively controlling their employees’ benefits through the 
manipulation of union officials.139  
II. Background on Reform in New Jersey and the 2011 Pension Reform Legislation 
  The 2011 Pension Reform Legislation was signed into law by Governor Chris Christie 
on June 28, 2011.140 The bill passed after months of partisan turmoil, when the bill’s sponsor, 
Senate President Stephen Sweeney (D-Gloucester), and Assembly Speaker Sheila Oliver (D-
Essex) pushed past their party’s majority sentiments to come to a compromise.141 While many of 
Governor Christie’s goals were met in the cost-cutting legislation, it seems that Sweeney and 
Oliver were able to reach a meeting of the minds with some elements of the law.142 For instance, 
while the law imposes new provisions concerning health care contributions, they expire in four 
years according to a sunset clause in the legislation.143  
However, NJ-CAN, a group formed in opposition to the reform bill,144 petitioned for 
removal of Sweeney and Oliver, alleging that they betrayed Democratic principles.145 NJ-CAN 
argued that the legislation destroys collective bargaining rights, and hopes to solicit members in 
support of ousting “Christiecrats,” or Democrats who voted for the bill.146 Oliver released 
statement citing the sunset clause as a rebuttal to “destruction” of bargaining rights.147  
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 Still, strong words from Assembly Majority Leader Joseph Cryan (D-Union) days before 
the bill was enacted indicate the sharp division on the issue.148 New Jersey unions also expressed 
opposition to the bill.149 Barbara Keshishian, president of the New Jersey Education Association 
(NJEA), stated that the changes in the law would be especially detrimental to public educators, 
as it could require an average contribution of fourteen percent from a teacher’s salary.150   
 While the NJEA and other unions have engaged in protests before the bill passed and 
initiated litigation challenging the bill, they also hoped to express their discontent at the 
legislative elections in November 2011.151 Ultimately, election results were favorable for 
Democrats, who gained a seat in the state Legislature.152 However, intra-party discontent was not 
absent from the election. Prior to the election, Senate President Sweeney defended his support of 
the law, claiming, “no one in the last 10 years has advanced more pro-labor legislation than I 
have. At the same time . . . I am also responsible to the taxpayers of this state.”153 Sweeney faced 
little opposition as a result of his involvement with the passing of the reform.154 However, 
Assembly Speaker Sheila Oliver faced great opposition as a result of her support of the law, and 
allegedly won her second term by coming to a compromise thanks to “Democratic power 
brokers.”155 
 
 a. Analysis of the Reform 
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 The 2011 Pension Reform Legislation affects public education employees, state judges, 
police and firemen, and other public employees.156 The law establishes new committees for some 
of the pension systems, whose members will be appointed both by the Governor and by 
unions.157 After meeting a “target funded ratio,”158 the committees may modify contribution 
rates, eligibility requirements, disability benefits, and may reinstate cost of living adjustments.159  
 The 2011 Pension Reform Legislation increases employee contributions from 5.5% to 
6.5%, and then to 7.5% after seven years160 for TPAF and PERS.161 Contribution rates will 
increase from 3% to 12% for JRS, phased in over the next seven years.162 Members of PFRS, 
and prosecutors of PERS will pay a 10% contribution rate, increased from 8.5%.163 Finally, 
members of SPRS will pay an increased rate of 9%, from 7.5%.164  
 Furthermore, public employees joining TPAF or PERS must accumulate thirty years of 
work and reach the age of 65 to retire, while members enrolled before November 1, 2008 may 
retire at age 60, and member enrolled between November 1, 2008 and June 28, 2011 may 
become eligible at age 62.165 New PFRS members will receive 60% of final compensation, rather 
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than 65% upon retirement.166 The law also eliminates the provision of law allowing a member of 
PERS or PFRS from retiring and receiving benefits while still maintaining a position in an 
elective public office and receiving full salary for the position, unless his retirement is based 
exclusively on that position.167  
 Finally, the 2011 Pension Reform Legislation eliminates the cost-of-living adjustment for 
current and future retirees and beneficiaries, unless it is reactivated as permitted by the bill.168 
While cost-of-living adjustments will not be provided unless reactivated by the system 
committees, those benefits that have been granted to retirees prior to the law will not be 
reduced.169  
 The law also provides that although the amortization method for the system’s unfunded 
liability will change for PERS, TPAF, SPRS, PFRS, and JRS, employers for those members will 
be contractually obligated to pay the required annual contributions to prevent underfunding.170 
The law also provides that employees may bring a breach of contract claim should his employee 
fail to pay these required contributions in the Superior Court, Law Division. 
 Current and new public employees and some public retirees will pay increased 
contributions for health care, not less than 1.5% of their compensation.171 Provisions for health 
care benefits become effective at varying times, according to collective bargaining agreements, 
and will expire four years after they become effective.172 The bill explicitly provides that 
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“increased employee contributions . . . for pension benefits and the contributions for health care 
benefits will begin upon the implementation of necessary administrative actions for collection 
and will not be applied retroactively to this bill’s effective date.”173 Thus, while the law does 
propose many changes, it does not purport to alter the rights of those public employees who have 
already earned their benefits. 
 While goals of the reform are articulated in the text of the legislation, there is evidence 
supporting alternative purposes as well. According to the 2011 Pension Reform Legislation, the 
changes that are set forth are necessary to comply with the Internal Revenue Code and 
Statements Numbers 43 and 45 of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board. Additionally, 
the legislation must comply with the Accounting and Financial Reporting by Employers for 
Postemployment Benefits Older than Pensions and the U.S. Department of Treasury regulations 
under 403(b) of Internal Revenue Code, pertaining to the Supplemental Annuity Collective 
Trust.174 Seemingly, the reform was enacted in order to meet accounting, financial, and tax-
related standards set forth by the Government. 
 Coincidentally, some sources indicate that while the reform may be necessary to comply 
with these regulations, it was also fueled by the necessity to reduce state expenditures. The 
Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee testified that increased state employee 
contributions to pensions could produce $3.9 billion in savings by 2021, and $120 billion by 
2041.175 Additionally, the Department of the Treasury predicted that the increases in health care 
contributions will provide $10 million to New Jersey, and $5 million to local boards of education 
and government.176 By 2021, these savings could increase to $1.4 to 1.6 billion.177 However, the 
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New Jersey Education Association and other unions allege, in their August 31, 2011 Complaint 
against the State, that the provisions for increased contributions and elimination of the cost-of-
living adjustment were established to remedy underfunding that had been going on since the 
1997 amendments.178   
 
III. Proposal for Adoption of Uniform Contract Approach to Pension Reform in New 
Jersey 
  
 Approaches to pension reform vary across the United States, creating uncertainty for 
policy makers, employers, and employees alike. In New Jersey, the recent legislation highlights 
the problems that result from such a lack of uniformity. An analysis of the policy of the 
legislation, the subsequent New Jersey litigation, and the likely outcome of that litigation will 
show that the state should adopt a clear, contractual approach to pension reform, which only 
alters terms prospectively, rather than retroactively. As a result, future legislation will allow 
employees to easily understand their rights. Additionally, future legislation will withstand 
potential challenges under the Contract Clause. 
a. Policy 
  
 As a threshold issue, it is necessary to ascertain whether the 2011 Pension Reform 
Legislation can stand in whole or in part. There are many aspects of the legislation that are 
generally not in dispute. In particular, provisions that apply prospectively will likely stand 
against litigation or other challenges, based on the success of past reform in New Jersey. 
Increased contribution rates for current and new employees, increased retirement age, and 
increased healthcare contributions would most likely survive primarily the changes do not 
threaten retirees’ earned benefits. Even outside of New Jersey, litigation challenging pension 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
177 Id. 
178 Complaint, supra note 3. 
26 
 
reform has not succeeded on terms altering contribution amounts and other prospective terms.179 
Finally, the committees established by the legislation have the authority, once the target funded 
ratios are achieved, to alter the contribution percentages. This flexibility written into the law 
further reduces the likelihood that these aspects of the legislation would fail under litigation.  
 However, some aspects of the legislation are more likely to fall under scrutiny, and 
moreover, arguably should not stand. Specifically, the elimination of the cost of living 
adjustments poses distinct problems. First, the 2011 Pension Reform Legislation eliminates cost 
of living adjustments for new and current public employees and current public retirees. The fact 
that the law repeals benefits earned by retirees bolsters a Contract Clause based argument. Some 
cases outside of New Jersey support this inference, but New Jersey case law has not yet dealt 
with such a circumstance.180 Further, the Ninth Circuit refused to find that elimination of cost of 
living adjustments constituted a violation under a progressive analysis, and New Jersey has 
exhibited deference to the Legislature.181 While other states may have a harder time successfully 
passing or maintaining reform on this issue, it seems likely that New Jersey will be able to retain 
this part of the 2011 legislation. The ambiguity of New Jersey pension reform legislation and 
common-law treatment of pension reform burdens employers and employees alike. As such, by 
adopting a uniform contractual approach to pension reform, parties will understand their 
obligations and rights to benefits.  
b. Litigation Outlook in New Jersey 
Although many states seem to adopt the contract approach, or at least modified versions 
of it, New Jersey has shifted little from its stance in Spina. Should a federal court have to apply 
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New Jersey state law, it seems that it would have to defer to legislative intent, rather than adopt a 
more liberal stance adopted by many of the circuit courts. 
Judge Paul DePascale, who sits in Hudson County Superior Court, brought his claim 
against the State for the changes to the Judicial Retirement System in July 2011.182 DePascale’s 
case was recently decided by Superior Court Judge Linda Feinberg on October 17, 2011.183 
DePascale argued that the 2011 Pension Reform Legislation violates Article VI, section six, 
paragraph six184 of the New Jersey Constitution, which protects judges from reduced 
compensation, as his biweekly contributions to JRS would increase from “$126.44 to 
$697.59.”185 The opinion indicates that “salaries” and “compensation” have no significant 
disparity under that section, rebutting defendant’s claim that pension benefits, typically regarded 
as compensation, were not governed by the New Jersey Constitution.186  
Furthermore, Judge Feinberg notes that in every previous amendment before the 2011 
Pension Reform Legislation, increases in contribution rates were accompanied by an increase in 
salary that made up for the loss.187 Although the Court recognized New Jersey’s precedential 
deference to legislation, it held that the 2011 Pension Reform Legislation lowers plaintiff’s 
salary without offering a substitute increase by increasing contribution rates, thus violating New 
Jersey’s Compensation Clause.188 While Judge Feinberg’s holding may indicate that New Jersey 
                                                          
182 MaryAnn Spoto, High Court Rejects Judge’s Suit Over Benefits: Complaint is the First Legal Challenge to 
Health Law, STAR-LEDGER, Aug. 16, 2011, at 016, available at 2011 WLNR 16222680. 
183 DePascale v. State of New Jersey, DOCKET No.:MER-L-1893-11, available at 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/decisions/DePascale34_111017.pdf. 
184 N.J. CONST. Art. 6, § 6, ¶ 6, states “The Justices of the Supreme Court and the Judges of the Superior Court shall 
receive for their services such salaries as may be provided by law, which shall not be diminished during the term of 
their appointment. They shall not, while in office, engage in the practice of law or other gainful pursuit.” 
185 DePascale, No.MER-L-1893-11 at 3-4. 
186 Id. at 22-24. 
187 Id. at 24. 
188 Id. at 35, 54. 
28 
 
is showing less deference to legislative enactments, it is important to point out that plaintiff 
succeeded under a constitutional source explicitly protecting his right to pension benefits. 
Several unions and individuals filed suit following the enactment of the 2011 Pension 
Reform Legislation. In their complaint, dated August 31, 2011, The New Jersey Education 
Association, New Jersey State Policemen’s Benevolent Association, Communications Workers 
of America, AFL-CIO and others alleged violations of the State Contract Clause, Due Process 
Clause, and Promissory Estoppel.189 Specifically, plaintiffs claim that the elimination of the cost-
of-living adjustment violates their non-forfeitable right to the benefit.190 Additionally, they argue 
that the benefits current employees, vested participants, and retirees would receive under the 
system are guaranteed as property interests.  
While previous cases in New Jersey indicate a commitment to rejecting the contract 
approach, DePascale illustrates that because of the extent of the modifications included in the 
2011 Pension Reform Legislation, as compared to previous legislation, may not withstand the 
traditional analysis. Thus, while the latest litigation cannot rely on a direct constitutional source 
of protection, it may have a better chance of success because of the drastic nature of the law. 
Still, unlike the majority of jurisdictions where pension benefits are treated squarely as 
contractual rights, New Jersey has consistently held that the Legislature is free to alter the 
methods by which pension plans are managed, despite the fact that employees have a contractual 
right to receive some sort of payment. 
                                                          
189 Complaint, supra note 3. 
190 Id. at 35. 
29 
 
On December 12, 2011, Judge Anne Thompson granted Legislative defendants New 
Jersey Senate and New Jersey Assembly’s motion to dismiss on procedural grounds.191 More 
recently, Judge Thompson granted the State of New Jersey, Governor Chris Christie, and New 
Jersey Treasurer Andrew Sidamon-Eristoff their motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.192 
The plaintiffs are planning to appeal, as Judge Thompson did not reach the merits of the case.193 
Conclusion: 
  
 The 2011 Pension Reform Legislation sets many changes to New Jersey’s public pension 
system into motion. As a result, many public employees have voiced their opposition in the 
public arena and through the courts. By examining various approaches to pension plans in a legal 
framework, detailing the specific aspects of the recent reform, and analyzing relevant litigation, 
it is unclear how New Jersey will ultimately handle the challenge to the constitutionality of the 
reform. It is evident, however, that public employees in New Jersey are taking the opportunity to 
alter the judiciary’s treatment of pension rights. The court’s initial decision to grant defendant 
legislators’ motion to dismiss illustrates the increasing likelihood that New Jersey will continue 
to grant deference to the Legislature concerning pension reform. However, to avoid inefficiency, 
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